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Abstract
The increasing availability of online and mobile information platforms is facilitating the development
of peer-to-peer collaboration strategies in large-scale networks. These technologies are being leveraged by
networked robotic systems to provide applications of automated transport, resource redistribution (collabo-
rative consumption), and location services. Yet, external observations of the system dynamics may expose
sensitive information about the participants that compose these networks (robots, resources, and humans).
In particular, we are concerned with settings where an adversary gains access to a snapshot of the dynamic
state of the system. We propose a method that quantifies how easy it is for the adversary to identify the spe-
cific type of any agent (which can be a robot, resource, or human) in the network, based on this observation.
We draw from the theory of differential privacy to propose a closed-form expression for the leakage of the
system when the snapshot is taken at steady-state, as well as a numerical approach to compute the leakage
when the snapshot is taken at any given time. The novelty of our approach is that our privacy model builds
on a macroscopic description of the system’s state, which allows us to take account of protected entities
(network participants) that are interdependent. Our results show how the leakage varies, as a function of
the composition and dynamic behavior of the network; they also indicate design rules for increasing privacy
levels.
1 Introduction
To date, the issues of privacy and security remain poorly addressed within robotics at large. These issues are
important in networked robotic systems (robot teams), where individual robots coordinate and plan their actions
by communicating explicitly (e.g., through radio communication) or implicitly (e.g., through observations) with
their network neighbors (in peer-to-peer mesh networks), and well as with with human operators or base-stations
(in asymmetric broadcast architectures) [3, 20]. When network communication channels are secured and data
is encrypted, analysis of the network traffic flow may still reveal sensitive information and lead to privacy
breaches [23, 25]. For example, the work in [25] shows that by observing a brief snapshot of network traffic, the
activities of the network users were accurately inferred. Privacy breaches may also incur if an adversary acquires
aggregated data sets (e.g., by gaining access to the base-station). In particular, it has been shown that even if
data is anonymized, adversaries can use independent anonymized data (i.e., side information) to breach privacy
in so-called composition attacks [9]. Other work considers data that describes physically observable phenomena.
For example, the work in [19] investigates the security of mobility platforms that release anonymous mobility
traces. The authors show that an adversary can infer the true identity of a user in a set of anonymous traces,
by making use of only a small amount of side information. The work in [4] considers a privacy preserving
approach to the problem of monitoring crowds and estimating crowd sizes without making use of people models
or tracking methods. Nevertheless, there is little work that describes how the privacy of physical systems is
affected by the behaviors of the dynamic agents that compose them.
The overarching goal of our work is to ensure the anonymity of agents that compose a heterogeneous collaboration
network. Working towards this goal, we present a method that allows us to quantify the loss of privacy that
incurs when third parties can take a snapshot of the state of the dynamical system. The novelty of our work
is that we quantify the loss of privacy of a dynamical system that is composed of connected and interdependent
robotic agents. This is not unlike the traditional setting of privacy, which considers computer databases of
independent entries, with the difference that here, the individual entries (our robotic agents) are dependent.
Our framework makes use of a mean-field approach that models ensemble averages. The resulting macroscopic
equation describes the system-wide dynamics, and allows us to compute the probability of any possible discrete
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system state. Subsequently, we use this measure to formulate a privacy metric that quantifies the maximum
deviation of any two observable system state distributions.
Definition 1 (Private Robot Network). A private robot network is a team of heterogeneous robots where it is
not possible to discern the type of an individual robot nor its specific interactions with other robots or human
users.
1.1 Related Work
Various measures of privacy have been proposed in the database literature so far. The early work in [1] proposes
a quantification of privacy in terms of the amount of noise added to a true value, or, in other words, how
closely the original value of a modified attribute can be estimated. This measure, however, omits the notion
of side-information, i.e., any additional information about the underlying distribution that the adversary might
own. The work in [7] extends the notion of privacy to include such prior knowledge. The proposed measure
suggests a quantification of the largest difference between an adversary’s a-priori to a-posteriori beliefs (which
corresponds to the worst-case scenario). It turns out that this model is significantly stronger, since it accounts
for infrequent, but noticeable privacy breaches.
In 2006, Dwork et al. introduced the notion of ǫ-indistinguishability, a generalization of the measure in [7],
and later coined the term of differential privacy [6]. Today, differentially private mechanisms are enjoying
tremendous success, due to their ability of dealing with arbitrary side information (a future-proof quality)
and worst-case scenarios [5]. As a result, differentially private mechanisms are being developed and applied to
various domains, including information networks [15], distributed convex optimization [11], Kalman filtering [16],
consensus algorithms [13], smart grids [14], and traffic flow estimation [17]. Although these approaches present
algorithms (mechanisms) that guarantee privacy levels, the common underlying assumption is that protected
individuals or signals are all independent.
In particular, our work distinguishes itself from former approaches in that we present a framework that incor-
porates the dynamics of an interdependent networked system, and casts the probability distribution over all
possible system states into a differential privacy formalism. In other words, we focus on developing a privacy
metric for such dynamical systems; we do not, however, design algorithms to control or optimize their dynamics
such that privacy constraints are met.
1.2 Contributions
The current paper presents a technique that allows us to analyze the privacy of networked systems composed of
interdependent agents by modeling the loss of privacy when an external observer is able to gather information
on the dynamic state of the system. We demonstrate the utility of our technique on hand of several case-studies.
Specifically, we make the following contributions:
1) Model of Networked Robotic System: We begin by formulating a framework that allows us to capture dy-
namic collaborations of interdependent robots and resources. We show how our model facilitates the design of
collaborations and dependencies through compound states, i.e., states that depend on multiple robots, humans
or resources. This model also facilitates the definition of observable system-level information, i.e., information
that can be observed publicly.
2) Privacy Model: The definition of privacy (or anonymity) is a difficult task, and a significant amount of
research in the database literature is dedicated to this subject. A recent successful definition is that of differential
privacy [6], which provides strong anonymity guarantees in the presence of arbitrary side information. One of
our main contributions in this work is the development of an equivalent notion of privacy that can be applied
to dynamic networks with interdependent robots, humans and resources, where the goal is to protect the type
of individual agents in the network. Our measure quantifies the loss of privacy that incurs when system-wide
observations are made.
3) Methods of Analysis: Finally, we present a technique that employs the robotic network model and privacy
model jointly to produce a quantitative analysis of privacy. The method uses a macroscopic description of the
system dynamics, which is plugged into a formula of differential privacy. We show that in specific cases, the
formula is closed-form, and can be computed efficiently. For the general case, we show how computational tools
can be applied to evaluate the formula.
2
2 Model of Networked Robotic System
We define a networked system composed of robotic agents, where each agent belongs to a type. The system is
composed of NS types S = {1, . . . , NS}, with a total number of N robots, and N (s) robots per type s such that∑
s∈S N
(s) = N . Robots interact (connect, collaborate, or create coalitions) a specific rate, which we assume to
be known or to be determinable through system identification methods. A robot of type s that is elementary
(non-interactive) occupies a state denoted by a
{s}
(.) . Robots that jointly interact share a state denoted a
I
(·). The
superscript I is the set of all robot types that are involved in this state, and the optional subscript denotes the
specific state activity, if available (e.g., transporting, sensing, etc.). For example, a
{1,2}
(transport) is a state where
robots of type 1 and 2 collaborate to jointly transport goods. Note that I may also be an empty set, which
indicates that the state is unrelated to any particular robot type (such states could be byproducts that relate
to performance metrics or environmental conditions, or could also be shared resources — e.g., a battery pack,
road lanes, or even network bandwidth).
The performance of networked robotic systems depends on collaborative mechanisms that require either physical
or virtual interactions. Our aim is to capture these interactions, and hence, we choose a modeling framework that
explicitly accounts for them. We build our formalism on the theory of Chemical Reaction Networks (CRN) [8],
as it presents an efficient way of defining collaboration mechanisms with dependencies; simultaneously, CRNs
provide tools to capture system-wide dynamics, enabling tractable analyses. Indeed, they are a powerful means of
representing complex systems— though not a new field of research, recent findings that quicken the computations
are accelerating the adoption of CRNs into domains other than biology and chemistry [21].
2.1 Chemical Reaction Network
We define our CRN as a triplet N = (A, C,R), where A is the set of states, C is the set of complexes, and R is
the set of reactions.
State set A: The state set encompasses all states that arise in the system, with A = {A1, . . . , ANA} where NA
is the number of states. States relating to a specific robot type s are denoted by A(s). The set of all states is
denoted
A =
NS
∪
s=1
A(s) and A(s) = ∪
s∈I
aI (1)
We can identify the compound states of an arbitrary subset of robots S˜ ⊂ S by considering the intersection of
sets ∩i∈S˜ A
(i). Trivially, if ∩i∈S˜ A
(i) = ∅, then the robots in S˜ do not collaborate. The CRN is a population
model, and allows us to keep track of the number of robots of any type in each of the states in A. Hence, we
define a population vector x = [x1, . . . , xNA ] ∈ N
NA
≥0 , where xi corresponds to the population present in state
Ai. We refer to the population vector x as the system-level state. In order to simplify the formulation of our
case studies later on, we will also use the notation xI to refer explicitly to the population in state aI .
Complex set C: The complex set is defined as C = {C1, . . . , CNC}, with NC the number of complexes, and
where Cj =
∑NA
i=1 ρijAi for j = 1, . . . , NC , with vector ρj = [ρ1j , . . . , ρNAj ]
⊤ ∈ NNA≥0 . A complex is a linear
combination of states, and denotes the net input or output of a reaction. In other words, a complex denotes
either (i) the states that are required for a certain reaction to take place, or (ii) the states that occur as an
outcome of a certain reaction that took place. The non-negative integer terms ρij are coefficients that represent
the multiplicity of the states in the complexes.
Reaction set R: We use complexes to formulate reactions Rl : Cj
rl−→ Ck. The reaction set is defined as R =
{R1, . . . , RNR}, with NR the number of reactions, such that Rl ∈ {(Cj , Ck)|∃Cj , Ck with Cj → Ck} for j, k =
1, . . . , NC , and where rl is the rate function rl(x;κl) : N
NA
≥0 7→ R≥0 parameterized by rate constant κl. In this
work, we use non-linear mass-action rate functions, and rl(x;κl) = κl
∏NA
i=1 x
ρij
i for all Rl = (Cj , ·). A set of
complexes that is connected by reactions is termed a linkage class. The net loss and gain of each reaction is
summarized in a NA ×NR stoichiometry matrix Γ, the columns of which encode the change of population per
reaction. In particular, the i-th column of Γ corresponds to the i-th reaction Ri = (Cj , Ck) and thus, the column
is equal to ρk − ρj . The elements Γji are the so-called stoichiometric coefficients of the j-th state in the i-th
reaction. Positive and negative coefficients denote products and reactants of the reaction, respectively.
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2.2 System Dynamics
We take a mean-field approach to model the system deterministically, and represent robot ensemble averages
with x (unlike x that denotes the discrete state). The average population value in the respective system states
changes according to an ordinary differential equation, described as follows
x˙ =MAψ(x), (2)
where ψ(x) returns a vector in RNC in which each entry ψj is the product of states in complex j (i.e., ψj =∏NA
i=1 x
ρij
i ), where M ∈ R
NA×NC is a matrix in which each entry Mij is the coefficient of state j in complex i,
and where matrix A ∈ RNC×NC is defined as
Aij =


κji, if i 6= j, (Ci, Cj) ∈ R
0, if i 6= j, (Ci, Cj) /∈ R
−
∑
(Ci,Ck)∈R
κki, if i = j
This general form captures non-linear dynamics. We note that when agents do not interact (and there are no
dependencies), the system exhibits linear dynamics. In this case, each individual state is also a complex, with
NA = NC . The matrix M is the identity matrix, and the function ψ(x) = x.
2.3 Continuous-Time Markov Chain
We can also model the system stochastically, and keep track of the exact number of robots in system states.
A simple stochastic model for CRNs treats the system as a continuous time Markov chain with state x ∈ NNA≥0
(i.e., the population vector), and with each reaction modeled as a possible transition for the state. This model
assumes that the time between transitions is exponentially distributed, and hence, the number of transitions
between two neighboring states is Poisson distributed. In order to calibrate rate constants κl on hand of a real
system, we can proceed by measuring the effective transition rates (by observing the number of transitions,
assuming the number of robots is known), and using the mass-action rate functions to solve for the parameter
values. The Chemical Master Equation (CME) [18] describes the temporal evolution of the probability mass
function over all possible population vectors, and is given by a set of ordinary differential equations associated to
the continuous-time, discrete-state Markov Chain. The CME is given by the linear ordinary differential equation
p˙i(t) = Kpi(t) (3)
with pi = [πxi |xi ∈ XN ] and where XN is the set of all possible population vectors x that can arise from the
CRN N . The entries of the transition rate matrix K ∈ R|XN |×|XN | are given by
Kij =


−
∑NR
m=1 rm(xi;κm), if i = j
rm(xi;κm), ∀j : xj = xi + ρl − ρk
withRm = (Ck, Cl)
0, otherwise
(4)
When the number of possible system-wide states |XN | is small, it is possible to obtain a closed-form solution
to Eq. (3). However, when |XN | is large or even infinite, it may become computationally intractable to solve
the system. In such cases, we can resort to Finite State Projection (FSP) methods [21] that approximate the
solution by compressing the number of possible states (and, hence, also the size of K). The idea of FSP is
to expand the number of states dynamically, according their probabilities. States with low probabilities are
pruned, and, hence, only statistically relevant states are added to the domain of the solver.
2.4 Observable System-Level State
Finally, we introduce two auxiliary functions that help us describe the system behavior: a function fN that
describes the system dynamics, and a query function q:
fN (x0, t) : N
NA
≥0 × R≥0 7→ N
NA
≥0
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q(x) : NNA≥0 7→ N
NO , NO ∈ N>0 (5)
The execution function fN samples a trajectory (up to time t) of system-level states, as given by the continuous-
time Markov chain, and returns a population vector x(t).
The query function q allows us to formalize the notion of an observable system-level state. It takes the population
vector x as input, and returns a vector of observable values y. In its most basic form, the query function is the
identity function, meaning that an observer is able to capture the exact (true) system-level state, and x = y. In
this work, we assume that the observed values take the form of simple summations over the population vector.
In particular, robots in their elementary states a
{s}
(·) are not identifiable, since this would lead to a direct breach
of privacy. This assumption is well motivated when the types of individual robots are not distinguishable from
an outside vantage point, and thus, only aggregated values can be observed. The components of y are given by
yi =
∑
j∈Ωi
xj (6)
with Ωi ⊂ {1, . . . , NA} and all Ωi disjoint.
3 A Motivational Example
Let us consider a simple example. Our robot network consists of two robot types {A,B} that access a resource
R, which is available to all robots in the network. The goal of this example is to illustrate that we can isolate
the type of a particular robot, just by observing the dynamic state of the system.
The system is defined as follows. The robots of type A and B utilize the resource R at rates r1 and r3,
respectively, and they return the resource at rates r2 and r4, respectively. The CRN of this system is formulated
as
a{A} + a{R}
r1−−⇀↽−
r2
a{A,R}
a{B} + a{R}
r3−−⇀↽−
r4
a{B,R}, (7)
where a{A} and a{B} denote the state of a robot of type A or B before the resource is allocated, and a{A,R}
and a{B,R} denote the state of the robots after obtaining the resource. The internal system state representation
is x = [x{A}, x{B}, x{R}, x{A,R}, x{B,R}]⊤. Fig. 1 illustrates the topology of this CRN. In our example, the
system composed of three robots, with two alternative instantiations, defined by adjacent databases D and D’.
These two databases differ by a single row, i.e., the type of robot with ID 2. Figure 2 illustrates the system.
We assume that two instances of the resource R are available to the robots. Initially, no resources are allocated,
hence, for database D, we have x0 = [2, 1, 2, 0, 0]⊤, and for database D’, we have x0 = [1, 2, 2, 0, 0]⊤. We
recall that system transition rates are defined as mass-action functions, with the transition rate matrix given by
a{A} a{B}a{R}
a{A,R} a{B,R}
r1, r2 r3, r4
Figure 1: Reaction topology for
the example in Eq. (7). Doubly
outlined circles represent com-
pound states.
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Robot IDRobot ID
Database D Database D’
TypeType
11
22
33
A
A
A
B
B
B
Figure 2: We consider two alternative sys-
tems, recorded in databases D and D’.
Robot no. 2 once belongs to type A, and
once to type B.
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κ4
2κ1
4κ3
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(b)
Figure 3: Continuous time Markov chains as defined by Eq. (7), for two variant systems, (a) D and (b) D’.
Eq. (4). The continuous time Markov chain corresponding to the two databases is shown in Fig. 3. We define
the observable system-level state as
y =
[
x{A} + x{B}
x{A,R} + x{B,R}
]
, (8)
which counts the number of robots using and not-using the shared resource. We note that state x{R} is factored
out, since we are only interested in protecting the types of the robots.
The observable distribution of the system at steady-state 1 for both database variants D and D’ is shown in
Fig. 4. Although the composition differs only in one entry, the distributions differ significantly. Now, let us
imagine that an adversary makes an observation of the system: 2 robots are currently not using the resource, and
1 robot currently is; hence, he concludes that the state is x = [2, 1]⊤. The adversary may own side-information,
for example, he may know the underlying system dynamics, and he can compute the expected distribution of
the system at steady-state. Building on this, he can infer that the more likely database is D’. In the worst
case — i.e., the adversary knows the types of both robots not using the resource — he can then directly infer
the type of the robot using the resource. For example, if the two robots not using the resource are type A and
B, then the probability that the robot using the resource belongs to type A is 0.43, and the probability that it
belongs to type B is 0.57.
On hand of this basic example, we demonstrated that the observable state of a system is affected by its in-
stantiation (database), and that it is easy to distinguish a system D from D’ (and hence isolate any robot) if
the likelihood that an observation belongs to either D or D’ is very different. Thus, if we want to conceal the
types of robots in the system, we need to ensure that the deviation in observable distributions is kept as small
as possible for all adjacent databases. We address this problem by first developing a model that quantifies the
loss of privacy, as a function of the structure of the collaboration mechanism, the collaboration rates, and the
system’s composition.
1By Theorem 4.1 of [24], we can show that this system has a unique, globally asymptotically stable positive equilibrium.
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y =
[
1
2
]
y =
[
2
1
]
y =
[
3
0
]
lim
τ→∞
P[q ◦ fN (x0(D), τ)]
lim
τ→∞
P[q ◦ fN (x0(D′), τ)]
P
Figure 4: Observable steady-state distribu-
tions, for databases D and D’ as defined in
Fig. 2. The rate constants are κ1 = 3, and
κ2 = κ3 = κ4 = 1.
4 Differentially Private Robot Networks
In this section, we develop our analogy to a formal definition of privacy that stems from the database literature,
and that is referred to as differential privacy (formerly known as indistinguishability) [6]. This concept considers
two key components: a database that holds sensitive information pertaining to individuals, and a query that
releases information obtained from the database via a mechanism. The goal of differential privacy is to develop
mechanisms that are able to provide information in response to database queries, while preserving the privacy
of the individuals recorded therein, even in the presence of arbitrary side information2. Side information can be
understood as a prior probability distribution over the database, and hence, privacy is preserved if no additional
information about this distribution is obtained through the query. It is important to note that the condition
of differential privacy is made with respect to the release mechanism (i.e., query), and does not depend on
the database itself, nor on the side information. In particular, if an individual’s presence or absence in the
database does not alter the distribution of the output of the query by a significant amount, regardless of the
side information, then the privacy of that individual’s information is assured.
Our analogy applies the concepts of database and query to the context of networked robotic systems. We
consider a database that represents the composition of our robotic system, and that records the types of each
of the robots. Also, we consider an external observer who is capable of observing the robotic system during its
operation, and who can query the system by retrieving information about the system-level state (i.e., observable
system-level state). Then, our analogous definition of privacy is the notion that the observer cannot obtain
private information about individual robots by querying the system (i.e., the type of a robot remains private,
cf. Def. 1). The composition of our robotic network is recorded in a database D ∈ SN that consists of N
entries, where each entry Di denotes the type of robot i. We define an adjacency set Adj(D) that encompasses
all databases D’ adjacent to D. Two databases D and D’ are adjacent if they differ by one single entry. In other
words, two robotic networks (represented by D and D’) are adjacent if they differ by one robot i, meaning that
robot i belongs to si in D (i.e., Di = si), and to a different type s′i 6= si in D’ (i.e., Di 6= si). As previously
described, the behavior of the robotic network can be described by tracking the states that compose the CTMC.
If we let the system run, it produces a trajectory that can be evaluated at a given time τ , resulting in a snapshot
of the population vector x. Our query/response model consists of an external user (adversary) who is able to
observe the system-level state at time τ — we refer to this model as a snapshot adversary.
Definition 2 (Snapshot Adversary). A snapshot adversary gains system-level information at a specific time
τ . This system-level information corresponds to the observable state y = q ◦ fN (x0(D), τ). A special case of
snapshot adversary is an adversary who queries the system once, at any time during its nominal (steady-state)
regime. This special case is referred to as the steady-state snapshot adversary.
The query q◦fN (x0(D), τ) depends on the system’s composition D, and the time at which the system is observed
τ . The function x0(D) : SN 7→ N
NA
≥0 distributes the robots in D to their initial states. A schema of this system
2In our context of a networked robotic system, an example of side information could be the number of manufacturing parts
ordered to build the system. If different robot species are made of different parts, such information can be used to construct an
initial guess about the number of robots per species. Thus, one would be able to derive the probability of a robot belonging to a
given species.
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D fN (x0(D), τ) q ◦ fN (x0(D), τ)
τ
x y
Figure 5: The composition of the robotic network is recorded in a database D. The function fN is the stochastic
process governing the dynamics of the robotic network, and returns a system-level state output x. Query
function q reads the (internal) system-level state, and returns the observable output y. Parameter τ denotes
the time at which the system is observed.
is shown in Fig. 5. Our aim is to analyze the differential privacy of the observed system output. To this end,
we propose a definition of differential privacy that is applicable to dynamic networked robotic systems.
Definition 3 (ǫ-indistinguishable robot network). A networked robot team, which, according to database D, is
composed of heterogeneous robot types that interact with dynamics defined by a system N , is ǫ-indistinguishable
(and gives ǫ-differential privacy) if for all possible team compositions recorded in databases D’, we have
L(D) = max
D′∈Adj(D)
∣∣∣∣ln P[q ◦ fN (x0(D), τ)]P[q ◦ fN (x0(D′), τ)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ. (9)
where P[y] denotes the probability of the output y, obtained through query q of the system-level state given by
fN .
The value ǫ is referred to as the leakage. Intuitively, this definition states that if two robotic systems are similar,
in order to preserve privacy they should correspond to similar distributions over their observable outputs. As
noted by Dwork et al. [6], the definition of differential privacy is stringent: for a pair of distributions whose
statistical difference is arbitrarily small, the ratio may be large, even infinite in the case when a point in one
distribution assigns probability zero and the other non-zero. Later, in our evaluations, we use a smooth version
of the leakage formula above, by adding an arbitrary, negligibly small value ν, uniformly over the support of
the probability distributions. This allows us to differentiate between large and small mismatches of the output
when one point of a probability distribution returns zero. Due to this addition, we are able to show continuous
privacy trends as a function of the underlying parameters.
5 Method
The formula in Eq. (9) provides strong privacy guarantees. Yet, it requires that we have a way of specifying the
probability distribution over the system’s observable output. The choice of method for computing this probability
distribution depends on several factors, such as system dynamics, time of observation (during transient vs.
stationary states), and computational complexity. Here, we will consider two alternative methods, (i) one that
yields a closed-form equation, but is only applicable to a certain class of system that admits a steady-state
snapshot adversary, and (ii) one that relies on numeric approximations, but that is generally applicable, and
that admits a generic snapshot adversary (see Def. 2).
5.1 Complex-Balanced Mechanisms
We present a method that computes the probability distribution at steady-state, which corresponds to the
dynamical system’s operational mode. We show how this can be done very efficiently for a class of CRNs whose
stationary distribution can be formulated analytically: complex-balanced CRNs.
Lemma 1 (Th. 3.2 [2]). If the system in Eq. (2) admits Aψ(x¯) = 0, then the system is complex-balanced,
with equilibrium point x¯ ∈ RNA . There is one, and only one, equilibrium point in each positive stoichiometric
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compatibility class; each equilibrium point of a positive stoichiometric compatibility class is locally asymptotically
stable relative to its stoichiometric compatibility class.
For systems that satisfy Lemma 1, we can follow Theorem (4.2) of [2] to define the stationary distribution
π¯D(x) = limt→∞ P[fN (x0(D), t)] of the stochastically modeled system. If the system is irreducible, this station-
ary distribution consists of a product of Poisson distributions and is given by
π¯D(x) =
NA∏
i=1
x¯
xi
i
xi!
e−x¯i , x ∈ XN (D) (10)
where XN (D) is the set of all possible population vectors x that can arise from the CRN N and the robot
species specified by D. We note that when the system is reducible, a similar equation exists, see [2].
We use this description to formulate a closed-form measure of the loss of privacy.
Proposition 1. If a networked robotic system defined by database D and CRN N is complex-balanced and
irreducible, and is observed through the identity query qN (x) = x, then its leakage at steady-state is
L(D) = max
D′∈Adj(D)
x∈XN (D)∪XN (D
′)
∣∣∣∣∣
NA∑
i=1
xiln
x¯i
x¯
′
i
− x¯i + x¯
′
i
∣∣∣∣∣ (11)
where x¯ and x¯′ are the population steady-states from Eq. (2) resulting from D and its adjacent database D’.
Proof. Starting with Eq. (9), and using query qN (x) = x, we have
L(D) = max
D′∈Adj(D)
∣∣∣∣ln P[fN (x0(D), τ)]P[fN (x0(D′), τ)]
∣∣∣∣ . (12)
At steady-state we have limτ→∞ P[fN (x0(D), τ)] = π¯D(x), hence
L(D) = max
D′∈Adj(D)
x∈XN (D)∪XN (D
′)
∣∣∣∣ln π¯D(x)π¯D′(x)
∣∣∣∣ . (13)
Continuing with Eq. (10) we get
L(D) = max
D′∈Adj(D)
x∈XN (D)∪XN (D
′)
∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
NA∏
i=1
x¯
xi
i
xi!
e−x¯i
)
− ln
(
NA∏
i=1
x¯
′xi
i
xi!
e−x¯
′
i
)∣∣∣∣∣ , (14)
which yields Eq. (11).
Corollary 1. If a networked robotic system defined by database D and CRN N is complex-balanced and ir-
reducible, and is observed through query qN (x) = y, with y ∈ N
NO
≥0 and each yi of the form
∑
j∈Ωi
xj, with
Ωi ⊂ {1, . . . , NA}, and all Ωi disjoint is
L(D) = max
D′∈Adj(D)
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
∑
{x|y=qN (x)∧x∈XN (D)}
π¯D(x)∑
{x|y=qN (x)∧x∈XN (D′)}
π¯D′(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (15)
This formulation, even though less compact than Eq. (11) above, still provides a fast means of computing the
leakage for complex-balanced systems — in particular, the alternative to using this formulation is to compute
the probability mass function P via the Chemical Master Equation [22], which, in our experience, is at least one
order of magnitude slower. Moreover, we note that Eq. (11) is linear in x, and can, thus, be solved by integer
linear programming (ILP) methods. In summary, the analytical formulation for the privacy of complex-balanced
systems allows us to compute the leakage efficiently.
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Figure 6: Example of a collaboration mechanism
that is represented as a directed acyclic graph. The
CRN has three elementary states and four com-
pound states (represented by doubly outlined cir-
cles). There are L = 4 linkage classes, NC = 8
complexes, and rank(Γ) = 4.
5.2 General Mechanisms
In the general case of nonlinear dynamics, we may not be able to show that the underlying CRN is complex-
balanced, and hence, may not be able to derive a stationary probability distribution. Also, we may explicitly
need to analyze privacy during transient, non-steady-state, behavior. In this section, we detail a method that
enables the analysis of privacy for heterogeneous systems with arbitrary dynamics.
The most widely-used computational method for obtaining the time-dependent behavior of the state of a CRN
is the Stochastic Simulation Algorithm (SSA) [10]. The basic idea behind this algorithm is to use the propensity
rates to evaluate which reaction is most likely to happen within a given time interval. The result of the
algorithm is a sample state trajectory. To obtain meaningful statistical information, the algorithm needs to
be repeated a large number of times, which is computationally expensive overall. An alternative approach
consists of evaluating the CME, cf. Eq. 3. Since approaches based on the evaluation of the CME tend to be
more precise than those based on SSA (when they are computationally tractable), we adopt a solution that
builds on the former approach. The CME is given by the linear ordinary differential equation in Eq. (3). As
previously noted in Section 2.2, when the number of possible system-level states |XN (D)| is small, it is possible
to obtain a closed-form solution to Eq. (3). However, when |XN (D)| is large or even infinite, it may become
computationally intractable to solve the system. In such cases, we can resort to Finite State Projection (FSP)
methods [21] that approximate the solution by compressing the number of possible states (and, hence, also the
size of K). Finally, we compute the probability of the observable state y for a given time τ , which we can then
plug into our formula for differential privacy, Eq.(9). This is straightforward since πx(τ) is equivalent to P[x(τ)],
and thus, P[q ◦ fN (x0(D), τ)] is equivalent to πy(τ), where πy(τ) =
∑
∀x s.t.y=q(x) πx(τ).
6 Case Study: Complex-Balanced Systems
In this first case-study, we focus on complex-balanced systems and turn our attention to a particular type of
networked robotic system that can be described by a collaboration-DAG. See an example in Fig. 6.
Definition 4 (Collaboration-DAG). A collaboration-DAG is a topological representation of a CRN that defines
a collaboration mechanism. It is a directed acyclic graph, such that all state nodes Ai that compose a complex
Cj are connected to a reaction node (rm, rn) (representing both a forward and backward reaction) if and only if
there exists two reactions Cj
rm
−−⇀↽ −
rn
Ck, with rm, rn > 0.
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Figure 7: CRN topology correspond-
ing to Eq. (16) with three elemen-
tary states and two compound states
(with doubly outlines circles).
To apply Corollary 1, we must first show that this type of network is complex-balanced.
Proposition 2. The interaction of heterogeneous robots in a networked team with dynamics described by a CRN
is a complex-balanced mechanism if the underlying CRN can be represented by a collaboration-DAG.
Proof. According to Theorem 4.1 of [24], a CRN is complex-balanced if (i) it is weakly reversible and (ii) it has
deficiency zero. Condition (i) requires all complexes to be connected via some reaction pathway (cf. Def. 2.2
in [2]). If all compound states can be decomposed as well as composed, this is trivially satisfied. The deficiency
of a reaction network is δ = NC − L− rank(Γ), which is the number of complexes minus the number of linkage
classes, each of which is a set of complexes connected by reactions, minus the network rank, which is the rank
of the stoichiometry matrix Γ. Hence, we will show that NC = L + rank(Γ). From Def. 4 it follows that the
number of linkage classes L is equal to the number of reaction nodes, and the number of complexes NC is equal
to twice the number of reaction nodes. Thus, NC = 2L, and it remains to be shown that rank(Γ) = L. Matrix
Γ is of size NA ×NR, with NR = 2L (the network is weakly reversible). Since each new linkage class includes a
new compound state, there are L linearly independent columns in Γ, and, hence, rank(Γ) = L.
6.1 Example
We consider the example shown in Fig. 7. The system is composed of three types, S = {1, 2, 3}. Compound
states are formed with one robot per type, and with types 1 and 2 interacting prior to type 3. This behavior is
formalized with the following reactions:
a{1} + a{2}
r1−−⇀↽−
r2
a{1,2}, a{1,2} + a{3}
r3−−⇀↽−
r4
a{1,2,3} (16)
The states of this system are A = {a{1}, a{2}, a{3}, a{1,2}, a{1,2,3}}. Our population vector keeps track of the
number of robots per state, and is written
x = [x{1}, x{2}, x{3}, x{1,2}, x{1,2,3}] (17)
We consider an adversary who is able to observe the number of elementary (non-collaborative) robots, the
number of collaborations involving 2 robots, and the number of collaborations involving 3 robots. Hence, we
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formulate the observable data as y = [y1, y2, y3] with
y1 = x
{1} + x{2} + x{3}, y2 = x
{1,2}, y3 = x
{1,2,3}. (18)
Later, in Section 6.2, we generalize these equations with yi =
∑
{I||I|=i} x
I for all aI ∈ A, which counts the
number of compounds of a given size.
6.1.1 Analysis
We compute the steady-state x¯ by solving the deterministic system
MAκψ(x¯) = 0: 

1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1

 ·


−κ1 0 κ2 0
0 −κ3 0 κ4
κ1 0 −κ2 0
0 κ3 0 −κ4

 ·


x¯
{1}
x¯
{2}
x¯
{1,2}
x¯
{3}
x¯
{1,2}
x¯
{1,2,3}

 = 0. (19)
Since the number of robots per type is constant, we have
x¯
{1} + x¯{1,2} + x¯{1,2,3} = N (1)
x¯
{2} + x¯{1,2} + x¯{1,2,3} = N (2)
x¯
{3} + x¯{1,2,3} = N (3). (20)
From the equations in (20), we can express the variables x¯{1}, x¯{2}, x¯{3} as a function of x¯{1,2} and x¯{1,2,3}.
Using one of the five equations in (19), we can then express x¯{1,2,3} as a function of x¯{1,2} through substitution.
Then, proceeding with yet another equation in (19), we write the quartic equation
0 = κ1
(
N
(1)
−N
(3)
− x¯
{1,2} +
κ4N
(3)
κ3x¯{1,2} + κ4
)
·
(
N
(2)
−N
(3)
− x¯
{1,2} +
κ4N
(3)
κ3x¯{1,2} + κ4
)
− κ2x¯
{1,2}
, (21)
which only depends on variable x¯{1,2}. Of the four possible solutions to Eq. (21), there is only a single all-positive
solution (which corresponds to the single equilibrium of the complex-balanced system). Finally, we can compute
the leakage L(D) of the observed system according to Corollary 1.
6.1.2 Evaluation
The observable state is a function of the system-level state, and is defined by the number of robots per type
N (s), and by reaction rates κ. Hence, we vary these values to identify their relation to privacy. We note that
this relationship is made mathematically evident in Eq. (21).
We compute the leakage for two settings, shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9. In the first setting, we fix the reaction
rates and vary the robot populations of two types, while keeping the population of the third type fixed. In
Fig. 8(a), we observe a clear “valley” of minimum leakage values for an equal number of type 1 and 2. The
overall minimum is at N (1) = N (2) = 220, N (3) = 200. The plot also reveals that increasing the total number
of robots increases privacy, as shown by the expansion of the valley in the upper right corner. Panel Fig. 8(b)
shows the resulting leakage for varying types 2 and 3. We observe a sharp drop in privacy as the population N (2)
deviates from N (1), with a minimum at N (1) = N (2) = 220, N (3) = 200 (as previously observed in Fig. 8(a)).
We conclude that robot types 1 and 2 are interchangeable and should have a balanced number of robots for
increased privacy. This symmetry is apparent, (i) by looking at Fig. 7, where exchanging elementary states a{1}
and a{2} yields the same topology, and (ii) by observing that equations (19) and (20) remain identical when
x{1} and N{1} are exchanged with x{2} and N{2}, respectively.
In the second setting (Fig. 9), we vary the reaction rates while keeping the robot populations fixed. Figures 8(b)
and 9(a) indicate that if we increase the probability of initiating collaborations that involve more robot types,
either by increasing the number N (3), or by increasing the collaboration rates, we decrease privacy. Indeed, in
this setting, the collaborations of size 2 and size 3 are unique, hence, they expose more information about the
system.
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(b)
Figure 8: Leakage for varying populations of type 1 and 2 in the range [150, 300], while keeping the population
of type 3 fixed, and with fixed reaction rates κ = 1. In (a) N (1) and N (2) vary, with N (3) =200, and in (b) N (2)
and N (3) vary, with N (1) =220.
2.0
0.0
2.00.0
κ1
κ3
(a)
8.0
0.0
2.0
0.0
2.00.0
κ2
κ4
L
(b)
Figure 9: Leakage for varying collaboration rates with robot populations fixed atN (1) = N (2) = 220, N (3) = 200.
In (a) we vary the rates κ1, κ3 at which interactions are initiated, while fixing κ2 = κ4 = 1. In (b) we show the
reverse (varying the rates at which interactions terminate).
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Figure 10: Leakage for binary collaboration trees
of varying topology (with 16 leaves). Trees of same
depth are assembled by one violin plot that fea-
tures a kernel density estimation of the underlying
distribution. The Pearson correlation coefficient
evaluated on this data is 0.74.
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Figure 11: Leakage for 2000 trees with identical
topology (symmetric binary tree, with 8 leaves),
and with all 7 collaboration rates varied uniformly
and randomly in the range [0.1, 2] (decomposition
rates are held constant, equal to 1). The Pear-
son correlation coefficient evaluated on this data
is 0.97. The average group size is defined by∑
y∈Y p¯iy ·
∑NO
i=1 yii∑NO
i=1 yi
where Y = {q(x)|x ∈ X}.
6.2 Evaluating the Impact of Topology and Parameters
To expose the impact of a CRN’s topology on the leakage, we proceed by considering collaboration-DAGs that
can be represented by binary trees (i.e., each reaction node has 2 in-neighbors and 1 out-neighbor). For a
system composed of 16 robot types, we evaluate the leakage for each of the possible 10905 unlabeled binary
rooted trees with 16 leaves (which corresponds to the Wedderburn-Etherington number). Fig. 10 shows the
leakage as a function of the depth of the tree. We see a clear correlation (with a Pearson correlation coefficient
0.74 between irregular, unbalanced topologies (with greater depth) and high leakage values, and between more
balanced, symmetric topologies (with smaller depth) and low leakage values.
Next, to expose the impact of a CRN’s parameters (i.e., collaboration rates) on the leakage, we proceed by
considering a symmetric binary tree with 8 leaves (of depth 3), and we vary the collaboration rates uniformly
and randomly in the range [0.1, 2], gathering 2000 datapoints. The collaboration rates define the time spent in
states, and ultimately, they influence the average collaboration group sizes.
Fig 11 shows the leakage as a function of the average group size (at steady-state) for each set of rates. We see
a clear correlation between the average collaboration group size and the leakage (with a Pearson correlation
coefficient 0.97).
These results together indicate that privacy can be increased by (i) designing collaboration mechanisms that
are balanced (asymmetric collaboration mechanisms create more unique collaboration groups, and hence, reveal
more information about the system), or by (ii) throttling the collaboration rates (which tend to produce larger,
be more unique groups).
7 Case Study: General Mechanisms
This case study considers a more general form of collaboration, which is not complex-balanced. We formulate
an example of collaborative task solving: robot types have distinct (complementary) capabilities, and hence,
depend on each other in order to complete tasks. Our system is composed of three types, S = {1, 2, 3}. For any
given task to be completed successfully, one robot of each type must be present at the respective task.
There are a number of realistic scenarios that relate to this setting. A well-known work considers a setting where
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Figure 12: Topology of CRN corresponding
to Eq. (22). Solid black arrow are bi-
directional reactions, dashed arrows arrows are
uni-directional. Reverse reaction labels (r2, r4, r6,
r8, r10, r12, r14, r16, r18) are omitted for clarity.
Doubly outlined circles represent compound states.
a homogeneous system of robots is tasked to pull sticks out of the ground [12] — because the length of a single
robot’s arm is limited, a successful manipulation requires two robots to collaborate. Our current case-study
can be formulated analogously by expanding the original statement to a heterogeneous setting. By default, all
robots are in exploration mode, searching for tasks that need to be completed. A robot encounters tasks at a
certain rate. Once it has encountered a task that is either unattended, or that is occupied by one of the other
two types, it will wait at the task. The robot may abandon the task (with a given rate) before it is completed,
or wait until all other robots from the other types join the task. If the robot abandons the task, it returns to
exploration mode. If a robot encounters a task where both other types are already present, the three robots are
able to collaborate and successfully complete the task. All three robots then return to exploration mode. We
formalize this behavior with the following CRN:
a
{1}
(e)
r1−−⇀↽−
r2
a
{1}
(w) a
{2}
(e) + a
{3}
(w)
r13−−⇀↽−
r14
a
{2,3}
(w)
a
{2}
(e)
r3−−⇀↽−
r4
a
{2}
(w) a
{3}
(e) + a
{1}
(w)
r15−−⇀↽−
r16
a
{1,3}
(w)
a
{3}
(e)
r5−−⇀↽−
r6
a
{3}
(w) a
{3}
(e) + a
{2}
(w)
r17−−⇀↽−
r18
a
{2,3}
(w)
a
{1}
(e) + a
{2}
(w)
r7−−⇀↽−
r8
a
{1,2}
(w) a
{1}
(e) + a
{2,3}
(w)
r19−−→ a
{1}
(e) + a
{2}
(e) + a
{3}
(e)
a
{1}
(e) + a
{3}
(w)
r9−−⇀↽−
r10
a
{1,3}
(w) a
{2}
(e) + a
{1,3}
(w)
r20−−→ a
{1}
(e) + a
{2}
(e) + a
{3}
(e)
a
{2}
(e) + a
{1}
(w)
r11−−⇀↽−
r12
a
{1,2}
(w) a
{3}
(e) + a
{1,2}
(w)
r21−−→ a
{1}
(e) + a
{2}
(e) + a
{3}
(e)
(22)
The states of this system are
A(0) = ∅ A(2) = {a
{2}
(e) , a
{2}
(w), a
{1,2}
(w) , a
{2,3}
(w) }
A(1) = {a
{1}
(e) , a
{1}
(w), a
{1,2}
(w) , a
{1,3}
(w) } A
(3) = {a
{3}
(e) , a
{3}
(w), a
{1,3}
(w) , a
{2,3}
(w) }
with A = ∪s={0,1,2,3}A
(s), and where aI(e) corresponds to the exploration state and a
I
(w) to the waiting state
(e.g., a
{1,3}
(w) corresponds to the state where one robot of types 1 and one robot of type 3 are waiting at a task for
a robot of type 2). From the reaction equations above, we see that robots interact when two robots are waiting
for the remaining robot. The compound states are:
A(1) ∩ A(2) = {a
{1,2}
(w) }, A
(1) ∩ A(3) = {a
{1,3}
(w) }, A
(2) ∩ A(3) = {a
{2,3}
(w) } (23)
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Figure 13: Panels (a)-(d) show the marginal probability distributions resulting from πx(τ), for τ = 10, for all
nine components xi of x. Similarly, panel (e) shows the marginal distribution of πy(τ) over the components yi
of the observation data y. The data is obtained for encountering rates κ1, κ9, κ19 = 0.2, κ3, κ13, κ20 = 0.5 and
κ5, κ15, κ21 = 0.8, and abandoning rates κ2, κ8, κ10 = 0.8, κ4, κ12, κ14 = 0.5, and κ6, κ16, κ18 = 0.2, for species
1, 2, 3, respectively.
Our population vector keeps track of the number of robots per state, and is:
x = [x
{1}
(e) , x
{2}
(e) , x
{3}
(e) , x
{1}
(w), x
{2}
(w), x
{3}
(w), x
{1,2}
(w) , x
{1,3}
(w) , x
{2,3}
(w) ]. (24)
We consider an adversary who is able to observe the number of robots that are in exploration mode, the number
of robots that are waiting alone, and the number of robots that are waiting in twos. Hence, we formulate the
observable data as y = [y1, y2, y3] and
y1 = x
{1}
(e) + x
{2}
(e) + x
{3}
(e) , y2 = x
{1}
(w) + x
{2}
(w) + x
{3}
(w), y3 = x
{1,2}
(w) + x
{2,3}
(w) + x
{1,3}
(w) (25)
The topology of this collaboration mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 12. We note that the three robot types are
exchangeable within this topology (yet, by definition, the robot types are heterogeneous, and hence, contribute
to the collaborations through complementary skills). The reactions’ propensity rates can be attributed to the
individual types. For instance, reaction r7 is defined by the rate κ7 at which type 1 encounters tasks at which
type 2 is waiting. Hence, κ7 is attributed to type 1. We define these values as κ
(s), and summarize them
as κ(1) = [κ1, κ2, κ7, κ8, κ9, κ10, κ19], κ
(2) = [κ3, κ4, κ11, κ12, κ13, κ14, κ20], and κ
(3) = [κ5, κ6, κ15, κ16, κ17, κ18,
κ21]. As an example of the resulting dynamics, Fig. 13 shows the marginal distributions resulting from πx(τ),
for all nine components xi of x, and πy(τ), for all three components yi of y.
7.1 Evaluation
Since our query is a function of the system-level state, it is defined by the number of robots per type N (s), and by
propensity rates κ. By varying these values, we can show how system composition and behavior affect privacy.
We evaluate the leakage of the system for the three different settings. First, we fix the reaction rates κ = 1,
and we vary the population N (2) and N (3) in the range [1, . . . , 20] with N (3) = 10. Fig. 14(a) shows reduced
leakage along the diagonal N (1) = N (2). The minimum leakage occurs at N (1) = N (2) = N (3) = 10. As seen
previously, in Section 6.1.2, this result indicates that exchangeable robot types should have a similar number of
robots in order to maximize privacy. In other words, since types 1, 2, and 3 are exchangeable, larger differences
in the number of robots per type will produce more easily identifiable changes in the observable system-level
state distributions. The plot also reveals that increasing the total number of robots increases privacy, as shown
by the low leakage values in the upper right corner. Evidently, a system composed of many robots is more
opaque (to an external observer): probability distributions spread over larger population ranges, and, thus,
small differences in the initial population creates smaller differences in observable state distributions.
In the second and third settings, we fix the population N (1) = N (2) = N (3) = 10 and vary the reaction rates
in the range [0.2, 2]. Fig. 14(b) shows the leakage when we vary the rates at which species 2 (κ3, κ13, κ20)
and species 3 (κ5, κ15, κ21) encounter tasks. Fig. 14(c) shows the leakage when we vary the rates at which
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Figure 14: Differential privacy of the collaboration case study. The colorbar shows the leakage. In (a), we vary
the population of robots in types 2 and 3 while keeping type 1 fixed. In (b), we vary the task encountering rates
of types 2 and 3, and in (c), we vary the task abandoning rates of robot types 2 and 3, while keeping the rates
of type 1 fixed.
species 2 (κ4, κ12, κ14) and species 3 (κ6, κ16, κ18) abandon tasks. If we program the robot types with the same
rates, we obtain indiscernible behaviors (since the types are exchangeable), and hence, increase privacy. This
is exemplified in the plots, where off-diagonal values exhibit higher leakage, and the minimum leakage value is
situated at the cell corresponding to rate uniformity. Finally, we also note that for the considered parameter
ranges, varying the number of robots per type has a much larger impact on privacy than varying the behavior.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we showed how to analyze the privacy of a dynamical networked robotic system composed of
heterogeneous, interdependent robot types. Our main contribution consists of a formal definition that couples
the notion of differential privacy with a model of the collaborative robot network. In specific, we build on
the theory of Chemical Reaction Networks to formulate a macroscopic equation that describes the interactions
between robot types at a system-wide level. We showed how to evaluate the privacy through a closed-form
equation, if the collaboration mechanism is complex-balanced, or numerically, if the collaboration mechanism
has a general form. We evaluated our formula on two case-studies. Our results show that we are able to
determine how privacy levels vary as we vary the design parameters of the underlying system.
Although we cast our contributions into the context of robotic teams, the methodology is applicable to a wide
range of domains that study dynamical systems with interactive and interdependent agents and resources,
e.g., sharing economies (collaborative consumption), and city infrastructure systems. Privacy is an urgent and
important topic — systems that are capable of maintaining high levels of privacy are more secure and resilient.
In particular, as networked robotic systems become available to all, we need to understand how to ensure their
integrity so that human users are not compromised. We intend to further this line of work by developing active
privacy mechanisms that are able control the amount of information leaked, while maintaining overall system
performance.
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